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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 09-1197 
_______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JERVIS JERMAINE PRINGLE, 
 
       Appellant 
 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 2-07-cr-000594-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable John R. Padova 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 18, 2011 
_______________ 
 
Before:  RENDELL, AMBRO, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed : November 22, 2011) 
_______________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
 A jury found Jervis Jermaine Pringle guilty of possession of a firearm by a 
convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e).  The District Court 
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sentenced Pringle to 180 months’ imprisonment — the mandatory minimum sentence set 
by statute.  He appeals his conviction and sentence.   
Pringle’s attorney moves to withdraw as counsel under Anders v. California, 386 
U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that all potential grounds for appeal are frivolous.  Pringle 
filed numerous motions for extensions of time to file a pro se brief.  Eventually, we 
entered an order directing him to file his brief by a certain date (more than seven months 
after counsel submitted his Anders brief), after which no further extensions would be 
granted.  Pringle never did so.  We grant counsel’s motion and affirm Pringle’s 
conviction and sentence.
1
        
I. 
 As we write solely for the parties, we recite only those facts necessary to our 
decision.  In January 2007, City of Chester Police and the FBI executed a search warrant 
at Pringle’s residence.  During the search, they found a loaded handgun on the bedroom 
floor.  After waiving his Miranda rights, Pringle admitted that the gun was his.       
Pringle was later indicted on one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted 
felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e).  He filed no pretrial motions to 
suppress either the physical evidence against him or his admission that the firearm was 
his.  Instead he proceeded directly to trial, whereupon the jury found him guilty as 
charged.  He filed no post-trial motions. 
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction under 
18 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 3742.  
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 The Probation Office found that Pringle qualified as an armed career criminal 
because of four prior convictions for “serious drug offenses,” as defined by 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(e).  It calculated his advisory sentencing range as 235 to 293 months’ 
imprisonment.  The Government advocated for a sentence within the Guidelines range 
while Pringle moved for a downward departure from that range.   
 The District Court adopted the Probation Office’s Pre-Sentence Report (PSR), 
without objection from the parties, and found that the Government had proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Pringle qualified as an armed career criminal.  The 
Government had offered certified court records to establish three of Pringle’s four prior 
serious drug offenses listed in the PSR.  After hearing counsel’s arguments on the factors 
required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553 to be considered at sentencing, and permitting Pringle to 
speak on his own behalf, the Court imposed a sentence it considered “fair and 
reasonable:” 180 months’ imprisonment, which is the statutory mandatory minimum 
penalty, five years’ supervised release, a $1,000 fine, and a $100 special assessment.  
II. 
 Our rules provide that “[w]here, upon review of the district court record, trial 
counsel is persuaded that the appeal presents no issue of even arguable merit, counsel 
may file a motion to withdraw and supporting brief pursuant to Anders.” 3d Cir. L.A.R. 
109.2(a).  If we concur with trial counsel’s assessment, we “will grant [the] Anders 
motion, and dispose of the appeal without appointing new counsel.”  Id.  Accordingly, 
our “inquiry is . . . twofold:  (1) whether counsel adequately fulfilled the rule’s 
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requirements; and (2) whether an independent review of the record presents any 
nonfrivolous issues.” United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001).   
In his Anders brief, Pringle’s attorney identifies two potential grounds for appeal:  
the procedural and substantive reasonableness of Pringle’s sentence.  Our review of the 
record confirms counsel’s assessment that there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal.   
We review Pringle’s sentence for procedural and substantive reasonableness.  See 
United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 203 (3d Cir. 2007).  The District Court correctly 
calculated the advisory Guidelines range, listened to arguments from Pringle and his 
counsel, and considered the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C.§ 3553.  It explained its 
ruling and its decision to grant a very significant downward variance from the Guideline 
range of 235 to 293 months’ imprisonment to the statutory mandatory minimum of 180 
months’ imprisonment.  The Court’s sentence was undoubtedly substantively reasonable 
because the Court had no authority to impose a sentence less than the statutory mandatory 
minimum.  United States v. Kellum, 356 F.3d 285, 289-90 (3d Cir. 2004).   
*    *    *    *    * 
 Counsel adequately fulfilled the requirements of Anders.  Because our 
independent review of the record fails to reveal any non-frivolous ground for appeal, we 
grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm Pringle’s sentence.2  In addition, we 
                                              
2
Pringle is hereby advised that, under the Criminal Justice Act, counsel is not obliged to 
file a petition for rehearing in this Court or a petition for a writ of certiorari in the 
Supreme Court of the United States.  See L.A.R. 35.4; 109.2(b).  If Pringle wishes to 
pursue these avenues, he must do so pro se or through retained counsel. 
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certify that that the issues presented lack legal merit and that counsel is not required to 
file a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court.  3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(b). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
Should Pringle wish to file a petition for rehearing en banc, an original and 14 copies of 
the petition must be filed within 14 days of the entry of judgment, or if that time has 
passed, he may promptly file a motion to enlarge the time for such filing.  Counsel shall 
timely send a copy of this order to Pringle.  
 
 
